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CONFESSIONS OF A WHISTLEBLOWER:
THE NEED TO REFORM THE
WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISION OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
Jisoo KIM*
I. INTRODUCTION

A.

Life as a Whistleblower

David Welch sits down in the lounge chair of his home in
Huddleston, Virginia ready for his interview. 2 He is dressed
casually, wearing khaki pants and a yellow polo shirt. Welch was
the first whistleblower 3 to seek protection under the
* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, The John Marshall Law School; M.B.A.,
Loyola University Chicago - Graduate School of Business, 2007. I dedicate this
Comment to my parents and my sister for supporting me and believing in me
throughout my educational endeavors. I would like to thank the rest of my
family and friends for their encouragement and support. A special thank you
to the editors and staff of The John Marshall Law Review for their work on
this Comment, as well as all the faculty members who have guided me
through law school and prepared me to become a successful member in the
legal community.
1. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1627 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a
whistleblower as "an employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a
governmental or law-enforcement agency"); see also Curtis C. Verschoor, To
Blow the Whistle or Not Is a Tough Decision!, STRATEGIC FIN., Oct. 2005, at 22
(quoting Brian Martin, a professor at the University of Woolongong in
Australia who defines whistleblowing as a "disclosure about significant
wrongdoing made by a concerned citizen . .. motivated by notions of public
interest, who has perceived the wrongdoing in a particular role and initiates
the disclosure . . . to a person or agency capable of investigating the complaint
and facilitating the correction of wrongdoing").
2. Stephen Taub, Five Years Out of Work, CFO, May 18, 2007, available at
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9210493/l/c_9211482.
The beginning part of
this Comment is semi-fictional and is based on the interview with David
Welch done by CFO.com. The actual interview was conducted over the phone.

Id.
3. Id. Welch refused to certify certain financial results after questioning
the bank's accounting policies. Id. He was fired shortly after that, although
the bank claims Welch was fired for refusing to meet with its attorney and an
external auditor without his own attorney present. Id. The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), which oversees the initial
investigations of complaints, found that Cardinal did not violate Section 806
when firing Welch for refusing to meet with the external auditor. Deborah
Solomon, For Financial Whistle-Blowers, New Shield Is an Imperfect One,
241
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Whistleblower Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
("SOX").4 Five years5 later, he is giving his account of life as a
whistleblower.
"If you are a whistle-blower and you have no money, you have
to stop. The deep pockets of corporations can starve out an
unemployed whistle-blower," says Welch, who has now lost over
half a million dollars and was forced to sell his family farm and
move into a rental property.6 He had to look for a new job after his
former employer Cardinal Bancshares refused to reinstate him to
his position of Chief Financial Officer, even after a Department of
Labor ("DOL") Administrative Law Judge ordered that Welch be
reinstated.7 Now, Welch has a high mountain to climb before he
can find a job in the banking industry again. Welch recounts his
struggles, stating that "when prospective employers began to
check references, it was the end." "The bank told them I was a
whistle-blower. Prospective employers assumed I am not to be
trusted. I have a black eye in the accounting and banking
industry ... [iut's like there is a bull's-eye painted on you."8
Unable to find a job in the financial industry, Welch switched
careers and is now an accounting professor at Franklin University
in Ohio, after receiving his doctoral degree.9 Before ending the
interview, Welch is asked one final question, "[w]ould you do it

WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2004, at Al.
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered Sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
5. Welch filed for protection in 2002, and the interview took place in 2007.
Taub, supra note 2.
6. Id. Welch had also wiped out his savings and now drives a 1996 Subaru
with 270,000 miles on it. Id. By October 2004, Welch had already owed
90,000 dollars in legal fees alone. Solomon, supra note 3, at Al.
7. Taub, supra note 2. A "recommended decision and order" by the
Department of Labor is not considered a final order and Cardinal Bancshares
waited to see if Welch would file suit in the federal district court rather than
reinstate him. Id. Because the decision is not a final order and does not carry
a penalty against the employer for failing to reinstate, many employers simply
refuse to reinstate the whistleblower and instead rely on the fact that the
whistleblowing employee often does not have the financial resources to
continue a costly legal pursuit. Verschoor, supra note 1, at 21. In fact,
according to the National Whistleblower Legal Defense and Education Fund,
not a single whistleblower has been successful in getting reinstatement.
Whistleblower Protection Blog, http://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2008/08/
articles/corporate-li (last visited Feb. 14, 2010); see also Solomon, supra note
3, at Al (stating that, as of October of 2004, not a single SOX whistleblower
had returned to his or her job).
8. Taub, supra note 2. Even Welch admitted that if there were two
candidates of equal qualification, as an employer, he would choose the one
with a "clean history." Id.
9. Id.; Franklin University Faculty Profiles, http://www.franklin.edu/
About-Franklin/Faculty-Profiles/David-E.-Welch.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2010).

2009)

The Whistleblower Provisionof the Sarbanes-OxleyAct

243

again?"1 0 Welch sits in his chair and mulls over the answer.
Down in Brazil, Ruben Carnero is contemplating the same
thing. If given the chance, would he remain silent about his
employer's false invoices and inflated sales figures or would he
blow the whistle on his employer again?" Like Welch, he too
sought protection under Section 806, claiming he was retaliated
against by his employer; he was the first foreign employee to seek
Unlike Welch, Carnero is an
such protection in court. 12
Argentinean and worked outside of the territories of the United
States in a Brazilian subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, Boston
Scientific Corp., as the Latin American business development
director. 13
While Carnero and Welch lived a continent apart from each
other, they nonetheless had something in common; neither was
afforded the protection they thought they would receive under the
Whistleblower Provision of SOX.14 After six years of litigation, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Welch's claim and denied
reinstatement in August of 2008.15 As for Carnero, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals found that Section 806 did not apply to an
Argentinean working in Brazil and refused to reinstate him.16
This Comment examines the Whistleblower Provision of SOX
and its inability to protect whistleblowers. It also recommends a
new approach not only to better protect whistleblowers, but also to
encourage more whistleblowers to expose corporate fraud.
Part one of this Comment discusses the background on the
enactment of SOX and the Whistleblower Provision. Part two
discusses how the Whistleblower Provision has not been able to
protect whistleblowers as intended. Part three analyzes the
extraterritorial reach of Section 806 and updates the discussion on
Carnero in light of the recent O'Mahony1 7 decision. Finally, this
10. Taub, supra note 2.
11. Pamela A. MacLean, 'SOX' Does Not Extend Overseas, NATL. L.J., Jan.
16, 2006, at 5.
12. Id.
13. Id. The nationality and location of the whistleblower's job are
important factors and have been a source of confusion as to whether Section
806 would apply to foreigners or United States citizens working abroad. See
infra Part B (discussing the applicability of Section 806).
14. See Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 548 U.S. 906 (2006) (finding that Section 806 does not apply
extraterritorially to a foreign employee working for a foreign subsidiary since
there was not express congressional intent); Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 279
(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1985 (2009) (finding that Welch did not
engage in a protected activity as defined by Section 806 and thus, Cardinal
Bancshares did not violate Section 806).
15. Welch, 536 F.3d at 279.
16. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 18. Carnero would have received protection had
he been an American citizen working within the U.S. Id. at 6.
17. O'Mahony v. Accenture, Ltd., 537 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). In
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Comment proposes reformation of Section 806 in order to better
protect whistleblowers and clarify the confusion among courts on
its application and reach.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Introduction to SOX and the Whistleblower Provision
Concerned about the collapse of Enron and other corporate
scandals involving Fortune 500 companies, Congress hastily
enacted SOX.18 The enactment's main purpose was to rebuild
investor confidence in the U.S. securities market.19 It sought to
curb corporate fraud and other violations of securities regulations
by "improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures." 20 One of the key provisions in achieving this objective
is Section 806, known as the Whistleblower Provision. 21 The
Whistleblower Provision protects employees of public corporations
from being discriminated or retaliated against for reporting
fraudulent activities by their employer. 22 However, who is
February of 2008, the Southern District of New York found that Section 806
applied to a foreign employee in a foreign country if the alleged misconduct
took place within United States' territory. Id. 513-14.
18. See 148 CONG. REC. E1451-03 (daily ed. Jul. 25, 2002) (statement of
Rep. Sununu) ("The citizens of my state, and indeed all Americans, have
watched the stock market tumble as accounting scandals have shaken investor
confidence. Investors have watched as the values of their portfolios have
fallen. They want-and deserve-tough action against fraud and malfeasance.
In short, they want Wall Street to abide by the common sense principles that
guide Main Street, and the public deserves nothing less."); see generally
Beverley H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection
Under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Proposal for Change, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (2007)
(recommending changes to SOX); Jennifer Christian, Note, Whistleblower
Protection Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Key Provisions and Recent Case
Developments, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 331 (2006) (recanting the events that
led to the passage of SOX); James L. Buchwalter, Construction and
Application of Whistleblower Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C.A.
§1514(A)(a)(1), 15 A.L.R. FED. 2D 315 (2006) (analyzing cases interpreting the
whistleblower provisions of the law).
19. See Earle & Madek, supra note 18, at 4 (quoting that Congress' purpose
for enacting SOX was to "restore investor confidence by improving corporate
financial reporting"); see also 148 CONG. REC. S6683 (daily ed. Jul. 12, 2002)
(quoting a legislative clerk who reported that SOX was created as "to improve
quality and transparency in financial reporting and independent audits and
accounting

services

for public

companies,

. . . to increase

corporate

responsibility and the usefulness of corporate financial disclosure, to protect
the objectivity and independence of securities analysts, to improve Securities
and Exchange Commission resources and oversight").
20. 148 CONG. REC. 13,347, 13,347 H4383 (daily ed. Jul. 17, 2002)
(statement of Rep. Oxley).
21. Codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006).
22. "No company. . . or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or
agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or

2009]

The Whistleblower Provision of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct

245

protected and what constitutes a whistleblowing activity depends
on the reviewing court's interpretation. 23
1.

Who Is Protected?

The statute provides that any employee of a publicly traded
company is protected. 24 Nonetheless, it is unclear whether this
protection extends to employees of private subsidiaries of a public
corporation or employees working abroad for a covered employer.
Moreover, depending on the interpretation of the statute itself, an
employee of a private corporation that contracts with or acts as an
agent of a publicly held corporation may be covered as well. 25
Although most administrative and federal court decisions
have rejected the more broad interpretation of Section 806 to cover
employees of contractors and agents of the public corporation, 26
courts have found employees of private subsidiaries of public
corporations to be protected under Section 806.27 However, the
in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and
conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the employee" in
whistleblowing "fraud against shareholders." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(2)(2006).
23. See Christian, supra note 18, at 333-47 (reviewing the various
interpretations by the courts on what type of employees are protected under
Section 806 and what amounts to a protected activity).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006); see also Donn C. Meindertsma & Melinda
L. Kirk, Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Risks: Still Real, Still Hazy, WASH.
LEGAL FOUND., Jan. 26, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/126-07Meindertsma.pdf (noting that Section 806's protection is not limited to a
particular industry as some other whistleblower protections are, but rather
covers all publicly traded companies).
25. See Christian, supra note 18, at 333-34 (discussing that Section
1514A(a) may lend itself to two interpretations: broad and narrow). The broad
interpretation "would include not only employees of publicly held corporations,
but also employees of privately held corporations that contract or do work on
behalf of a publicly held corporation, such as law firms and accounting offices."

Id.
26. See Earle & Madek, supra note 18, at 7-8 (observing that this rejection
of the broad interpretation is rather odd, given the fact that OSHA's
regulation on SOX defines an employee as "an individual presently or formerly
working for a company or company representative, an individual applying to
work for a company or company representative, or an individual whose
employment could be affected by a company or company representative").
Furthermore, OSHA's regulation defines a company representative as "any
officer, employee, contractor or subcontractor, or agent of a company." Id.
Given these definitions, one would expect courts to accept the broader
interpretation to include employees of contractors or agents, even if they are
private companies. Christian, supranote 18, at 334-35.
However, the public parent
27. Christian, supra note 18, at 335.
corporation has to have some control over the subsidiary, such as oversight of
the audit committee, direct or indirect contribution to its financials, and
authority to affect whistleblowing employee's employment. Id.; see also
Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines, 2003-SOX-27, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at *58
(A.L.J. Apr. 30, 2004) (finding that, while a parent corporation is generally not
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employee cannot just bring a complaint against its private
employer; the parent public corporation must usually be named as
a party in the complaint. 28
Courts have had different opinions as to the extraterritorial
application of Section 806. The First Circuit, as discussed above in
Carnero, as well as many DOL administrative decisions have
refused to extend protection to employees outside of the U.S.29
However, in O'Mahony v. Accenture, Ltd., the Southern District of
New York Court found that Section 806 may apply to foreign
employees in a foreign country if the alleged misconduct originated
within U.S. territory.3 0
2. What Is a ProtectedActivity?
The Whistleblower Provision protects employees retaliated
against for providing information or assisting with investigations
conducted by "a Federal regulatory agency or law enforcement
agency," any member or committee of Congress, "a person with
supervisory authority over the employee," or "such person working
for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or
terminate misconduct." 31 It also protects employees who are
involved in a proceeding or investigation related to an alleged
violation. 32 Most importantly, the employee must actually "blow
the whistle," that is, provide information about an alleged
fraudulent activity by the employer to the specified authorities in
the statute. 33
Moreover, in order to be protected, the whistleblowing
employee must have had reasonable belief that the employer
liable for acts done by its subsidiary, a parent corporation will be found liable
if the subsidiary is merely an instrumentality of the parent corporation).
28. Christian, supra note 18, at 335; see also Meindertsma & Kirk, supra
note 24, at 3 (stating that many cases have been dismissed because the
complaint did not name a public corporation as a defendant).
29. See Carnero, 433 F.3d at 18 (finding that SOX protection does not
extend overseas); see also Michael Delikat, Developments Under SarbanesOxley Whistleblower Law, in INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 2007: LEGAL, ETHICAL

& STRATEGIC ISSUES 56 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No.
11355, 2007) (discussing the various ALJ decisions that did not extend
protection to employees outside of the United States).
30. O'Mahony, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 515. The court applied what is known as
the conduct test rather than the presumption against extraterritoriality test
used by the First Circuit. Id.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2006). See also Terry M. Dworkin, SOX
and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1761 (2007) (stating that much
like other whistleblower statutes, Section 806 does not protect those who go
straight to the media to blow the whistle).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(2) (2006).
33. See Christian, supra note 18, at 346-47 (discussing that an employee
who merely refuses to participate in fraudulent activity is not protected since
it was not expressed in the statute unlike other federal whistleblower
provisions).
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committed mail, wire, bank, or securities fraud, 34 violated the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") regulations, or
violated any other federal provision relating to fraud against
shareholders.3 5 The reasonable belief standard is met if a
reasonable person with the same information and position as the
employee would have also believed a violation occurred.3 6
Whether the claim turns out to be true or not is irrelevant for
protection as long as the whistleblowing employee actually
believed the employer committed fraud against its shareholders.37
Nonetheless, the alleged misconduct by the employer must be
based on a violation of securities fraud outlined in the statute to be
considered a protected activity.3 8
3. Procedures Used to File a Complaint
A retaliated employee must file a complaint with the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") within
ninety days of the alleged violation. 39 The complaint must also
34. As codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, 1348 (2006).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
36. Christian, supra note 18, at 345. Nonetheless, a court may conclude
that the employee could not have had reasonable belief based on the
employee's job duties, training, or education. Eden P. Sholeen & Rebecca L.
Baker, Unlocking the Mysteries of SOX Whistleblower Claims, 44 HOUS. LAW.
10, 12 (2007).
37. See Christian, supra note 18, at 345 (stating that even in cases where
the employee was completely wrong regarding the legality of the employer's
act, the employee will still be protected if the court finds the employee's belief
was reasonable); see also Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 477 (5th
Cir. 2008) (stating that "an employee's reasonable but mistaken belief that an
employer engaged in conduct that constitutes a violation of one of the six
enumerated categories is protected"); Halloum v. Intel Corp., ARB No. 04-068,
2006 WL 3246900, at *5 (Dep't of Labor Jan. 31, 2006) (finding that
reasonable belief was satisfied even though employer's alleged fraudulent
accounting method was found to be an accepted accounting principal).
38. See Sholeen & Baker, supra note 36, at 13 (noting that many employees
were not protected under Section 806 because they alleged violation of internal
employment policies, ethical breaches, racial discrimination, etc., that did not
relate to fraud against shareholders and, thus, not covered under SOX).
39. Id. at 15. The complaint must be written with sufficient facts alleging
the acts that constitute retaliation. Id. Additionally, the statute of limitations
runs once the employer communicates to the employee the adverse decision.
Id. In limited circumstances, the court may toll the statute of limitation, such
as "if the defendant affirmatively misleads the plaintiff regarding the cause of
action, if the plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been prevented from
asserting his or her rights, and if the plaintiff has raised the precise statutory
claim in issue but has mistakenly done so in the wrong forum." Id. at 15-16
(quoting Lotspeich v. Starhe Memorial Hosp., 2005-SOX-14, 2005 DOLSOX
LEXIS 51, at *9 (A.L.J. Mar. 3, 2005); see also Dworkin, supra note 31, at 1763
(noting that, unfortunately, many cases are dismissed because of the relatively
short statute of limitations period since "[m]ost claimants don't realize what
their rights are and how to pursue them in such a short period"); Richard
Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-
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contain four elements establishing a prima facie case before OSHA
begins an investigation: 40 (1) the employee was engaged in a
protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of the protected
activity; (3) the employee suffered an unfavorable personnel
decision; and (4) the surrounding circumstances indicate that
there is an inference that protected activity was a contributing
factor 41 in the unfavorable action. 42 After the investigation, OSHA
renders an opinion, which can be appealed to the Office of
Administrative Law Judges ("AL") by either the employee or the
employer. 43 If no decision is made within 180 days of filing of
complaint, the employee can file suit in a federal district court. 44
4.

Type of Relief

If the whistleblower is successful in his claim, he is entitled to
reinstatement, backpay with interest, and special damages
incurred as a result of the discrimination, "including litigation
costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees." 45 The
Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 67 (2007)
(stating that only 3.6% of whistleblowers have won relief through this initial
administrative process conducted by OSHA in the first three years of
implementation).
40. Sholeen & Baker, supra note 36, at 14. If the complaining employee
does not establish the four elements, the complaint will be dismissed even
before the investigation commences. Id. In addition, even if the complainant
establishes a prima facie case, if the employer can "demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have taken the same unfavorable personnel
action in the absence of the complainant's protected behavior or conduct," the
investigation will not proceed. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(c) (2004).
41. A contributing factor means "any factor which, alone or in connection
with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision."
Marano v. Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (2d Cir. 1993).
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(b)(1) (2004). Generally, the shorter the time
between the protected activity and the adverse personnel decision, the more
likely the inference of causation will be met and the burden satisfied. 29
C.F.R. § 1980.104(b)(2) (2004).
43. Sholeen & Baker, supra note 36, at 17. The review must be filed within
thirty days upon receiving the findings and preliminary order; and if the
requesting party fails to object in a timely manner, the decision becomes final
and no judicial review takes place. Id. The ALJ reviews the matter de novo
and determines whether there is causation between the protected activity and
the adverse personnel decision. Earle & Madek, supra note 18, at 10. The
decision by the ALJ must be appealed to the Administrative Review Board
(Board) within ten business days after decision and the Board's decision can be
appealed to United States Court of Appeals, if filed within sixty days of final
order. Id. at 12.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2006); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1980.114(a)
(2004) (noting that there must be "no showing that there has been delay due to
the bad faith of the complainant"); Solomon, supra note 3, at Al (stating that
the deadline of 180 days for a DOL decision has been missed more often than
not).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2006). In fact, "an employee prevailing in any
action ... shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole."
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statute does not allow for punitive damages and is silent on
whether damages for loss of reputation or pain and suffering
would be allowed. 46
B.

Why Whistleblowers Are Important

When Congress enacted SOX, it was very mindful of the
importance of whistleblowers in uncovering fraudulent activities
by public corporations. 47 This was evident in the fact that
Congress, in enacting SOX, made Section 806 one of the main
components of the entire statute. 48 Members of Congress took
measures to ensure that the DOL did not interpret certain
provisions too narrowly and thus limit the rights of
whistleblowers. 49 Moreover, in a recent study measuring the
effectiveness of various methods of detecting corporate fraud,
internal employees 5o-in other words, whistleblowers-turned out
to be the most effective monitors in detecting fraud.5 1 This is
Id.; see also Dworkin, supra note 31, at 1763 (noting that although the statute
authorizes a remedy to "make the employee whole," recovery is limited to
equitable compensatory damages and an employee cannot recover for punitive
or emotional damages). Studies have shown that without allowing the
employee to recover more than just equitable damages, SOX remedies did not
"adequately compensate the employee for the risks taken in reporting
suspected wrongdoing" nor encourage whistleblowing as a result. Id.
46. Earle & Madek, supra note 18, at 3.
47. See 148 CONG. REC. S7350, S7358 (daily ed. Jul. 25, 2002) (statement of
Rep. Leahy) (stating that "[w]e learned from Sherron Watkins of Enron that
these corporate insiders are the key witnesses that need to be encouraged to
report fraud and help prove it in court . . . [t]here was no way we could have
known about this without that kind of a whistleblower.").
48. See Brad Levy, Comment, Pretty New SOX, but Plenty of Holes: An
Analysis of the Government's Inability to Apply Section 806 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 Extraterritorially,40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 225, 230 (2007)
(stating that Section 806 was not just an "afterthought, but rather a central
component" of SOX since one of the main reasons SOX was enacted is to
protect whistleblowers).
49. See 149 CONG. REC. S1725-01 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2003) (statement of
Rep. Leahy) (stating that Congress intended to interpret SOX broadly); see
also Deborah Solomon & Kara Scannell, SEC is Urged to Enforce 'WhistleBlower' Provision, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2004, at A6 (reporting on Senators
Leahy's and Grassley's efforts to ensure SEC is working with DOL to protect
corporate whistleblowers).
50. The authors of the study labeled employees as external monitors and
considered company management, board of directors, or the firm itself as
internal governance. ALEXANDER DYCK, ADAIR MORSE & LUIGU ZINGALES,
WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE ON CORPORATE FRAUD 39 (2006), available at
http://www.whistleblowersblog.org/Zingales,%20Whistle%20on%2OCorp%2OFr
aud%20Nov06.pdf. This Comment uses the phrase "internal employees" to
differentiate between those employees hired by the company on a contract
basis, such as auditors or attorneys.
51. See id. (finding that employees accounted for 19.2% of fraud reported
between 1996 and 2004). Other reports of fraud came from non-financial
market regulators (e.g., industry regulators and other government agencies
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because employees oftentimes have access to information
unavailable to the public or even external auditors. 52 It would be
very difficult to investigate corporate fraud without the corporate
whistleblower, let alone discover instances of fraud, as many
companies enforce the "corporate code of silence" and discourage
employees from blowing the whistle. 53 Finally, whistleblowers
play a critical role in restoring investor confidence as they tend to
receive encouraging attention from the media 54; thus, protecting
them also becomes critical to further build investor confidence.55
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Failureto Protect

While Congress patted itself on the back, and various scholars
and members of the media applauded it for enacting the
Whistleblower Provision, the legislative branch has not been able
to protect the whistleblowers as it had initially intended.56 The
failure is mostly attributed to the Provision's procedural
such as State Attorney General's offices, the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA"), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), etc.) at 16%,
media at 16%, analysts at 14.7%, auditors at 14.1%, SEC at 5.8%, equity
holders at 3.2%, and insurance and plaintiffs law firms at 2.6%. Id.
52. See id. at 26 (stating that "[e]mployees clearly have access to
information for few if any frauds can be committed without involving some of
them."). The scholars also contend that the number of employees blowing the
whistle would be higher if there was less tension between access to
information and lack of incentives to blow the whistle. Id.
53. Levy, supra note 48, at 231.
The apparent efforts to cover up any alleged misconduct by Enron or
Andersen were not limited to Andersen and the destruction of physical
evidence and documents. In a variety of instances when corporate
employees at both Enron and [Arthur] Andersen attempted to report or
"blow the whistle" on fraud, they were discouraged at nearly every turn.
Id. (quoting a Senate Judiciary Committee report on SOX).
54. Id. at 230. In fact, Sherron Watkins, who blew the whistle on Enron,
Cynthia Cooper, who blew the whistle on WorldCom Inc., and Coleen Rowley,
who blew the whistle on the Federal Bureau of Investigations, shared Time
magazine's Person of the Year award in 2002. John Gibeaut, Culture Clash:
Other Countries Don't Embrace Sarbanes or America's Reverence of WhistleBlowers,
A.B.A.
J.,
May
2006,
available
at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/cultureclash/; see also Solomon,
supra note 3, at Al (stating that Welch expected to be successful in his claim
against Cardinal because other whistleblowers, such as Watkins and Cooper,
"were winning praise and gracing magazine covers").
55. See Levy, supra note 48, at 231 (arguing that the main reason Congress
enacted SOX was to protect investors by providing protection for
whistleblowers).
56. See Moberly, supra note 39, at 69-70 (stating that, despite high.
expectations, SOX yielded disappointing results). Many scholars initially
praised the SOX's Whistleblower Provision as one of the most important
whistleblower provisions in the world. Id. at 68.
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difficulties, OSHA's inexperience in investigating securities fraud,
and the lack of adequate remedies.5 7
1. ProceduralDifficulties
Much of the confusion surrounding the Whistleblower
Provision has to do with the procedure of filing a grievance.5 8 As
an initial matter, the ninety day statute of limitations to file a
retaliation claim is rather short.59 Many times, the aggrieved
employee is not aware of his rights under the statute or what
constitutes protected activity.6 0
Moreover, the statute of
limitations period begins when the employee learns of the
employer's intent regarding the adverse decision and not when the
adverse decision is actually implemented and the employee suffers
the consequences. 61 In fact, in 2006, fifteen percent of the SOX
whistleblower cases were dismissed for failure to file suit within
the statutory period. 62
Second, the scope of protection under the statute is narrow.63
The Whistleblower Provision only protects an employee when he or
she provides information to persons identified in the statute. 64
The statute does not protect those who blow the whistle to persons
such as co-workers without supervisory authority, state or local
authorities, or the media.6 5 Furthermore, the reasonable belief
57. See Dworkin, supra note 31, at 1764-65 (arguing that SOX's statutory
scheme is more illusory than meaningful because of the complex procedures,
short statute of limitations, and inadequate remedies).
58. See Moberly, supra note 39, at 71 (stating that employees frequently
lose their claim due to violation of a procedural rule or failing to meet the
statutory requirements); see also Solomon & Scannell, supra note 49, at A6
(stating that majority of whistleblower claims have been dismissed for
technical reasons).
59. Dworkin, supranote 31, at 1763.
60. Id.; see also Christian, supra note 18, at 339 (noting that the short
statute of limitations has been a frequently litigated issue, many of which
resulted in the dismissal of claim); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the
Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of Reform Versus Power, 76 U.
CIN. L. REV. 183, 217 (2007) (stating that ninety days may not be sufficient
for an employee to determine that adverse action was due to the
whistleblowing activity).
61. Christian, supra note 18, at 339. However, the employer's intent to
implement the adverse decision must be a "final, definitive, and unequivocal
notice" to the employee. Id. (quoting Halpern v. XL Capital, Ltd., 2004-SOX54 (A.R.B. Aug. 31, 2005)).
62. Meindertsma & Kirk, supranote 24, at 2.
63. See Moberly, supra note 39, at 100 (arguing that part of the reason why
SOX whistleblowers have a low win rate is attributed to the fact that the
employee has to demonstrate that he is within the boundaries of protection,
i.e., he is a covered employee working for a covered employer and was engaged
in a protected activity).
64. Ramirez, supra note 60, at 201.
65. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006) (outlining the entities which can
receive information that constitutes fraud against shareholders such as
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standard, in essence, assumes the whistleblowing employee has a
thorough understanding of all the specific fraud statutes covered
in Section 806 because it does not protect the employee if the
violation falls outside the scope of the specified fraud provisions.66
The employee must understand and objectively believe the
employer's conduct was sufficiently material to amount to fraud
against the shareholder even before OSHA conducts an
investigation.6 7
Third, although the Whistleblower Provision seems employeefriendly, in reality, employers have an advantage under the
statute.6 8 On its surface, the fact that the employee's only burden
under the Provision is to prove that the protected activity was a
contributing factor in the adverse decision seems to favor the
employee.69 The employer, however, can rebut that fact by
showing, with clear and convincing evidence, 70 that he or she
would have made the same adverse decision against the employee
based solely on a legitimate business reason.7 1 But because most
federal regulatory or law enforcement agencies, any members or committees of
Congress, and persons with supervisory authority over the employee).
66. See Ramirez, supra note 60, at 207 (arguing that the whistleblower
protection is narrowly drafted to limit protection and presumes that
whistleblowing employees "enjoy facility with all relevant statutes and possess
the ability to predict whether a court would find a violation."); Meindertsma &
Kirk, supra note 24, at 3 (n6ting that the DOL administrative review board
adopted a standard that requires the whistleblowing employee to allege that
the employer's wrongdoing "definitely and specifically" violated a category of
fraud listed under Section 806 in order to be protected); see also Allen, 514
F.3d at 479 (holding that plaintiff did not engage in protected activity because
she is a CPA, and, therefore, the objective reasonableness of her belief is
evaluated from the "perspective of an accounting expert," who should have
known that her employer's conduct did not violate any securities laws).
67. See Stephen B. Stern & Jonathan Cohen, Pleading a Sarbanes-Oxley
Act Whistleblower Claim: What Is Required to Survive?, 23 LAB. LAW. 191, 204
(2007) (noting that the DOL has stated Section 806 only applies to objectively
reasonable complaints regarding fraud against shareholders). Many DOL
decisions require that the alleged misrepresentations be material. Id.
68. See Moberly, supra note 39, at 72, 120 (noting that while the burden of
proof under Section 806 seems "employee friendly," because of the various
procedural hurdles, employees have only won 10.7% of causation cases at the
OSHA level); see also Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protection Under the
Sarbanes-OxleyAct: A Primer and a Critique, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
831, 863 (2007) (arguing that there is an "inherent bias against the
complainant at the investigative and hearing stages of the proceedings.").
69. See Moberly, supra note 39, at 79-80 (commenting that the contributing
factor of causation is an easy burden to meet for the employee).
70. See Christian, supra note 18, at 352 (stating that the clear and
convincing burden is a higher burden than the preponderance of the evidence
burden that the employee must meet).
71. Id.; see Halloum, 2003-SOX-7, at *8 (finding that employer who
provided evidence of employee's violation of company policy alone established
legitimate business reason by clear and convincing evidence for termination of
whistleblower). But see Platone, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at *13 (finding
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states have adopted the at-will employment doctrine, the breadth
of legitimate reasons under these state laws is wide, and many
employers escape liability for terminating whistleblowers. 72
Moreover, the complainant does not have access to the employer's
response to the complaint or any other documents submitted to
OSHA during the investigation stage.73 This, in turn, does not
allow the employee to rebut any inaccuracies that may be
contained in the employer's response. 74
Finally, the time period it takes to receive a final disposition
is too long for the employee.75 The legislature designed Section
806's procedure to be an expedited process.76 But during its
investigation, the DOL frequently relaxes the implemented
timelines or misses them all together.77 Moreover, the decision by
the DOL is not final and can be appealed to an appellate court,
which then can draw out the process even more. 78 This prolonged
process is disadvantageous to the employee because in most cases
they have fewer resources than the employer and cannot afford to
partake in lengthy litigation.7 9
2. Inexperience of OSHA in InvestigatingFraud Claims
Part of the reason why the DOL misses the investigation
timelines is due to the OSHA investigator's inexperience in
that, although employer alleged that employee was terminated for a romantic
relationship with a union leader in conflict of her management position within
the company, a legitimate business reason, employer failed to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that she would have been terminated for the
failure to disclose the relationship alone).
72. See Watnick, supra note 68, at 860-61 (arguing that "the convergence of
the at-will employment doctrine and the burden set out for a Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower, leave the whistleblower largely unprotected").
73. Id. at 864.
74. Id.
75. Id. The longer it takes to decide the case, the longer the employee must
go without a paycheck while continuing to pay legal fees. Id. at 841.
76. See id. at 864 (stating that the strict timelines that were put in place
are not being followed).
77. See id. (stating that DOL often grants extensions, to employers in most
cases, thereby hurting the employee who needs immediate relief); see also
Solomon, supra note 3, at Al (stating that DOL frequently misses the deadline
of 180 days to conduct an investigation and issue a final order).
78. Earle & Madek, supra note 18, at 11-12; see also Ramirez, supra note
60, at 209 (noting that, in 2006, the median time to litigate a civil case in a
federal court was 8.3 months). Moreover, the district court reviews the
complaint de novo, and therefore resources and time spent within the DOL's
process are essentially "wasted." Id.
79. See Ramirez, supra note 60, at 208 (stating that the time it takes a
claim to process through the administrative or legal procedure affects the
protection afforded to a complainant); Earle & Madek, supra note 18, at 25
(stating that many whistleblowers cannot financially survive years of
litigation while waiting for a disposition without any compensation and that
"[w]histleblowing should not be an option only for the wealthy few.").
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assessing security fraud claims.80 Although OSHA is in charge of
administering some whistleblower statutes, it mainly deals with
labor and employment matters.8 1 Securities fraud, on the other
hand, is a much more complex matter that requires the
understanding of sophisticated financial documents and
accounting practices in order to spot the financial irregularities
and violation of a SOX provision. 82 In a SOX claim, it is essential
that the OSHA investigators understand the intricacies of
securities fraud because they do not merely determine whether a
They must also determine
company violated a provision.83
whether it was reasonable for the employee to have believed that
his employer committed fraud based on the facts of the claim
before finding that he or she is protected. 84 However, OSHA
investigators do not have the requisite training, background, or
experience to assess these claims, as securities fraud is not an area
of competence nor is it within OSHA's general arena of health and
safety matters.85 In addition, OSHA is hampered by its limited
authority.8 6 It does not have the power to subpoena companies to
submit documents or order witnesses to testify, nor can it place
anyone under oath before a court.87 Even if the OSHA investigator
finds in favor of the employee and orders reinstatement, its
decision is merely a preliminary order that cannot be judicially
enforced against the employer.88

80. See Ramirez, supra note 60, at 210-11 (stating that OSHA investigators
are required to become familiar with each statute, procedural requirements,
and burdens of proof before commencing investigation; but with their core
competence being employment law, they do not have the training to assess
SOX claims).
81. See Earle & Madek, supra note 18, at 15 (describing the types of claims,
such as sexual harassment or anti-union claims, that OSHA ordinarily deals
with).
82. See id. (arguing that OSHA investigators do not have the training to
understand violations of accounting principles because financial frauds are
"not simple commonsense matters" as with other employment law violations
such as sexual harassment); see also Solomon, supra note 3, at Al (stating
that financial frauds are difficult to detect as even financial regulators and
investors failed to spot fraud at Enron, WorldCom, and other places for years).
83. Solomon, supra note 3, at Al.
84. Id.
85. See Ramirez, supra note 60, at 211 (noting that many practitioners
believe neither OSHA investigators nor their supervisors have the necessary
disposition, training, or experience to assess SOX claims, as they are outside of
OSHA's area of expertise); Solomon, supra note 3, at Al (commenting that
OSHA lacks financial or accounting expertise).
86. Solomon, supra note 3, at Al.
87. Id.
88. Watnick, supra note 68, at 856; see Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc.,
448 F.3d 469, 472-73 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that SOX does not authorize the
district court to enforce preliminary orders or reinstatement by OSHA).
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3. InadequateRemedies
Assuming that the whistleblowing employee is successful in
his claim and is reinstated to his job, these factors alone do not
provide an adequate remedy to the aggrieved employee.89 These
whistleblowing employees are spending countless hours and
resources "just to secure reinstatement and some financial
compensation" for doing the right thing.90 Mere reinstatement of
her position does not "make the employee whole."91 In fact, many
employees who blew the whistle and remained or were reinstated
to their jobs did not stay much longer. 92 Oftentimes, they were
subject to emotional abuse, isolation, and increased demands from
the employer. 93 Moreover, even if an employee tries to seek
alternative employment, her reputation as a whistleblower will
follow her, making it extremely difficult to find another job in the
industry.94
The fact that Section 806 does not provide for punitive
damages and is silent on damages for loss of reputation or
emotional damages undercuts the effectiveness of the statute. 95
89. While Section 1514A(c)(1) entitles a successful claimant to "all relief
necessary to make [her] whole," 1514A(c)(2) limits relief to only equitable
compensatory damages and not other damages such as punitive or emotional,
essentially only providing reinstatement as an actual remedy. Dworkin, supra
note 31, at 1763.
90. Earle & Madek, supra note 18, at 30.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2006).
92. Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World,
39 Hous. L. REV. 905, 950 (2002).
93. See id. at 951 (describing a study on health effects for whistleblowers
who remained employed). More than eighty percent of the whistleblowers who
were part of the survey experience stress related symptoms during the process
of whistleblowing. See id. (citing a study that found that twenty-nine of
thirty-five whistleblowers surveyed experienced stress related symptoms).
Nearly half of the employees started to take prescription medicines that they
had not taken before whistleblowing and also considered suicide. Id.
94. See id. at 952-53 (stating that some employers will go as far as to attack
the employee's credibility in the industry to ensure that the employee does not
find future employment); see also Taub, supra note 2 (discussing Welch's
experience as a whistleblower and his inability to find a job in the banking
industry as a result of his former employer's interference).
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2006) (outlining available remedies under the
Whistleblower Provision). Although it is generally recognized that punitive
damages are not allowed under the statute, some courts have allowed recovery
of damages based on injury to reputation. See Hanna v. WCI Cmtys. Inc., 348
F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (finding that "a successful SarbanesOxley Act plaintiff cannot be made whole without being compensated for
damages for reputational injury that diminished plaintiffs future earning
capacity"). But see Murray v. TXU Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10945, at
*10-11 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2005) (finding that Congress would have included
recovery of non-pecuniary loss such as injury to reputation within the statute
if it intended to provide such damage recovery, and thus plaintiff is not
allowed to recover damages for injury to reputation).
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Studies have shown that whistleblower statutes that do not
provide for punitive or emotional damages are ineffective in
inducing whistleblowers because they do not provide an adequate
relief to the whistleblower for taking the risk in reporting her
employer's wrongdoing.96 Moreover, whistleblower provisions that
provide for financial incentives have been much more effective in
inducing whistleblowers.97
Coupled with the fact that most
whistleblowers have not been successful in court, lack of adequate
remedies will deter more whistleblowers from coming forward with
information important to a corporate fraud investigation.98
B. Extraterritorial
Application of Section 80699

Congress' failure to specify whether the Whistleblower
Provision protects employees outside U.S. territory has generated
great discussion because of the benefits and detriments of
extraterritorial protection: on one hand, allowing extraterritorial
application of SOX could have economic and political implications
if it conflicts with foreign law or policy; 0 0 on the other hand, not
protecting foreign whistleblowers could cause foreign subsidiaries
96. Dworkin, supra note 31, at 1763. Section 806 is based on a "protective
whistleblower legislative model," which assumes that most employees are
"people of conscience" and would blow the whistle if the fear of retaliation is
not present. Id. at 1768; see also Bucy, supra note 92, at 959 (noting that
Congress had a rational basis for that assumption as studies have shown most
whistleblowers were model employees with strong moral senses and social
responsibility).
97. See Bucy, supra note 92, at 970 (finding that giving financial incentives
to whistleblower may be far more effective in spurring whistleblowers); see
also Ben Depoorter & Jef De Mot, Whistleblowing: An Economic Analysis of
the False Claims Act, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 135, 140-41 (2006) (finding that
since the amendments of 1986 to the False Claims Act-giving the
whistleblower a larger percentage of the recovery as an incentive to litigate
fraudulent claims against governmental contractors on behalf of the
government-the number of whistleblowers increased drastically).
98. See Levy, supra note 48, at 231 (arguing that lack of meaningful
protection from whistleblower statutes deters an employee from taking the
risk of reporting corporate wrongdoings).
99. See Caryn R. Nutt, Comment, Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corporation:
Interpreting the ExtraterritorialEffect of the Civil Whistleblower Protection
Provision of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct, 41 U.S.F.L. REV. 201, 202 (2006) (stating
that "[t]he provision does not explicitly protect, nor does it explicitly exempt
from protection, employees working abroad for foreign subsidiaries of United
States corporations."); see also Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388-89
(2005) (finding that, generally, a statute enacted by Congress is presumed to
apply within the territory of the U.S.). However, that presumption will be
overcome if there is a significant effect on the U.S., harm to U.S. commerce or
interest, or if the "center of gravity of a transaction" is in the U.S. 44B AM.
JUR. 2D International Law § 71.
100. See Dworkin, supra note 31, at 1777 (noting cases where American
companies instituted measures for SOX compliance abroad that caused
conflicting policies with host country).
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of U.S. companies or foreign companies trading in the U.S.
securities market to disregard SOX with less risk of its fraudulent
activity being exposed.10 1 This is because the employees of such
companies would not have an incentive to blow the whistle
without protection.102 Courts seem to be conflicted in interpreting
congressional intent as well. Although in Carnero, the First
Circuit found that Section 806 does not apply extraterritorially,10
the recent O'Mahony decision of the Southern District of New York
extended the protection to a foreign national working abroad. 104
1. A Brief Explanation of Carnero

Ruben Carnero is an Argentinean who was employed by both
Boston Scientific Argentina S.A. ("BSA") and Boston Scientific Do
Brasil ("BSB"), subsidiaries of a Delaware corporation, Boston
Scientific Corporation ("BSC").105 Both BSB and BSA terminated
him in 2002 and 2003 respectively, and he alleged that his
terminations were in retaliation for reporting to BSC that its
Latin American subsidiaries were engaged in fraudulent
accounting practices.106 Carnero's case eventually made it to the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 07 The court found that
Carnero would indeed be a covered employee who was retaliated
against by his employer in violation of Section 806- except for the
fact that he is a foreign employee who was employed abroad. 08
The court decided the case under the presumption against
extraterritorial application, reasoning that neither the express

provisions nor the legislative history indicates that Congress
intended
for
the
Whistleblower
Provision
to
apply
extraterritorially.1 0 9
While it is true that the Whistleblower Provision does not
show an express congressional intent for extraterritorial
application, the First Circuit neglected to consider both the
"conduct" test and the "effects" test in assessing the potential

101. Id.
102. Levy, supranote 48, at 227.
103. Carnero,433 F.3d at 18.
104. O'Mahony, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 515.
105. Carnero,433 F.3d at 2.
106. Id. at 2-3.
107. Id. Carnero initially filed a complaint against BSC with DOL under the
Whistleblower Provision. Id. Although DOL found that BSC was a covered
employer under SOX, it dismissed Carnero's claim, reasoning that the
Whistleblower Provision did not apply to employees working abroad. Id. at 4.
Carnero subsequently filed suit in the district court of Massachusetts to
review his Whistleblower Provision claim, which was also dismissed. Id.
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id. at 9-16. The Court also emphasized that it did not want to open the
gate for U.S. courts to start adjudicating employment relationships between
foreign employees and their employers. Id. at 15.
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extraterritorial application.1 10 On the other hand, the Southern
District of New York correctly considered both the "effects" and
"conduct" tests to rebut the presumption against extraterritorial
application.111

2. O'Mahony Decision
The O'Mahony case involves a foreign national who worked
for a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign company that traded in the U.S.
securities market.112 Although at the time O'Mahony filed suit,
she was no longer employed within the U.S., she alleged that the
subsidiary in the U.S. tried to use her in a scheme to defraud the
French government of tax revenue."13
In O'Mahony, the Court for the Southern District of New York
recognized that there is a general presumption against
extraterritorial application of statutes when Congress remains
silent as to such application.11 4 The court went even further and
noted that in such cases, the Second Circuit also considers two
factors: (1) whether the alleged misconduct took place within the
U.S.; and (2) whether the alleged misconduct has a substantial
adverse effect in the U.S. market." 5 The court distinguished
Carnero and applied the conduct test.116 It reasoned that,
although the case involved a foreign employee, the alleged
110. See Levy, supra note 48, at 235-36 (stating that courts often use the
"effects" test or "conduct" test, or a combination thereof, when deciphering
legislative intent of an extraterritorial application of a statute).
111. See O'Mahony, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (applying the "effects" and
"conducts" test in determining extraterritorial application of a statute).
112. Id. Rosemary O'Mahony is an Irish national who was employed by
Accenture LLP, the U.S. subsidiary of Accenture Ltd., a Bermuda company
that traded on New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 507. She worked for
Accenture LLP from 1984 to 2004. Id. She left the U.S. in 1992 for an
expatriate assignment in France and was subsequently employed by
Accenture SAS, Accenture's French subsidiary in 2004. Id. at 507-08.
113. Id. at 508.
114. Id. at 512.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 511-12. The factors the Court considered in applying the conduct
test were:
(1) the elements of the wrongful conduct in question as pled in plaintiffs
theory of fraud in relation to the specific acts to which the statute apply;
(2) the location of domestic conduct and contacts associated with the
transaction in relation to those located in foreign states; (3) the timeline
identifying when and where the relevant domestic and foreign acts
occurred; (4) the materiality/substantiality of the domestic conduct
relative to the particular fraudulent transaction the pleadings describe;
(5) the causal connection between the domestic conduct and the alleged
financial losses resulting from the alleged fraudulent transaction; and
(6) an overarching measure of reasonableness gauged by the intent of
congressional policy and principles of fairness in the circumstances
surrounding the particular case.
Id. at 512-13.
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fraudulent conduct took place within the U.S. by executives
located in the U.S.117 Moreover, the conduct occurred while the
plaintiff was still employed by the U.S. subsidiary, even though
she was working abroad at the time; therefore, the court concluded
it had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants.11s
This decision was an important one because it helped
preserve the congressional intent to protect American investors
and the U.S. securities market by extending protection to foreign
employees.1 19 Although the court ultimately stated that its
decision does not have any implications of extraterritorial
application of the Whistleblower Provision because the alleged
fraudulent conduct was done by a company located in the U.S., it
was an important first step in extending protection to foreign
employees employed abroad and, in turn, in deterring foreign
subsidiaries from engaging in fraudulent conduct abroad. 120
IV. PROPOSAL
A. ProposedAmendments and Revisions
of the Whistleblower Provision

Before the intent of SOX is fully realized, the Whistleblower
Provision must give meaningful protection to those who help
discover fraud from within a company. 121 In order for that goal to
be achieved, various amendments and revisions need to be
implemented. 122 On the procedural side, this includes extending
the statute of limitations, expanding the scope of protected
activities, requiring the disclosure of any documents submitted to
the adjudicating body by the employer, and having a department
within the SEC, instead of OSHA, investigate complaints. On the
substantive side, it includes making employers more accountable
for retaliating, making the preliminary reinstatement order
judicially enforceable, having an incentive-based provision rather
than the current protection-based provision, and extending
protection to employees of foreign subsidiaries and U.S. employees
working abroad.

117. Id. at 513-14.
118. Id. at 515.
119. Nutt, supra note 99, at 218.
120. O'Mahony, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 514-15.
121. See Dworkin, supra note 31, at 1764 (stating that the Whistleblower
Provision only "gives the illusion of protection without truly meaningful
opportunities or remedies for achieving it").
122. See Watnick, supra note 68, at 834 (arguing that changes need to be
made to better protect whistleblowers and encourage them to come forward
with information on corporate fraud).
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1. ProceduralReforms
a. Extending the Statute of Limitations Period
The statute of limitations to file a claim should be extended
from 90 days to at least 180 days.123 This will give the aggrieved
employees more time to consult with attorneys or other experts in
order to learn their rights and remedial avenues to be pursued.124
The extension of the statute of limitation will also protect those
employees with valid claims who are ignorant of the short filing
period and have their cases dismissed.125
b. Expanding the Scope of Protected Activities
The scope of coverage on the whistleblowing activity must be
expanded. First, the requirement that the employee only report to
statutorily identified persons in order to be protected should be
amended to include state and local authorities, non-supervisory coworkers, and, in limited circumstances, the media.126 Second, any
disclosure of fraud that violates the law or affects the public health
should be protected. This protection should expand beyond mere
disclosure of specific instances of fraud listed within the statute.
This will help protect whistleblowers by alleviating the pressure

123. See Earle & Madek, supra note 18, at 6 (stating that an amendment to
the SOX bill shortened the statute of limitations period from 180 days to 90
days).
124. See Ramirez, supra note 60, at 218 (arguing that extending the statute
of limitations period to one year would provide the employee adequate time to
recognize retaliation and ways to remedy the situation without believing
things will fall back into place and the retaliation will stop); Earle & Madek,
supra note 18, at 52 (asserting that a longer statute of limitations period is
necessary to encourage more whistleblowers to blow the whistle).
125. See Meindertsma & Kirk, supra note 24, at 2 (finding that in 2006,
fifteen percent of cases were dismissed because of failure to file within the
statute of limitations period); see also Moberly, supra note 39, at 132 (finding
that in 46.4% of the ALJ cases where the claim was dismissed because of
failure to file within the statutory period, the claim was filed between 90 and
180 days from the adverse action).
126. See Ramirez, supra note 60, at 202 (arguing that disclosures made to a
"public body," which includes all federal, state, and local agencies in all
branches of the government, as well as pertinent boards, committees, and
other governmental offices, should be protected). Whistleblowing to the media
should be protected if. (1) the employee has previously blown the whistle to a
designated authority, both internally and externally, with substantially
accurate evidence of fraud; (2) no response had been made; and (3) the
employee reasonably believes that the employer will destroy the evidence of
fraud and retaliated as a result. See Elletta S. Callahan, Terry M. Dworkin &
David Lewis, Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and U.S. Approaches to
Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 879, 893-94 (2004)
(outlining the circumstances under the Employer Rights Act of United
Kingdom where the whistleblower can make protected disclosures to the
press).
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on them to have sufficient legal knowledge to link the misconduct
by their employer to the specific fraud provisions within the
statute in order to be protected. 127
c. Employee Access to Any Employer Submitted Documents
Employees need to have access to employer submissions made
to OSHA during the investigation stage. Without full disclosure of
employer submitted documents to the employee, the employee will
not have the opportunity to rebut any erroneous assertions the
employer may make in its submissions. 128 This may ultimately
lead to an adverse decision against the employee, who then has to
appeal to an ALJ, prolonging the process and incurring even more
legal expenses while potentially being unemployed. 129
d. The SEC Should Investigate Claims Rather Than the DOL
DOL and OSHA are ill-suited to investigate the complex
nature of securities frauds because their expertise lies in
employment matters. 30 The SEC, who is in charge of protecting
investors in the U.S., should be responsible for the investigation as
they already have the requisite knowledge and experience that can
only be acquired from handling cases involving complex financial
matters. More specifically, the Division of Enforcement should
handle the SOX claims as its staff regularly conducts investigation
of securities fraud and has the authority to institute
administrative proceedings against corporations or individuals in
violation of the statute. 131

127. See Moberly, supra note 39, at 113-14 (finding that 24.1% of ALJ cases
and 18.2% of OSHA cases were found in favor of employer based on the fact
that the employee did not allege violation of statutorily specified fraud
provisions). There are numerous cases where both ALJs and OSHA interpret
the protected activity narrowly to find that whistleblowers are only protected
if they can demonstrate "a direct line between their disclosures of misconduct
and the misconduct's relationship to shareholder fraud." Id. at 117.
128. See Watnick, supra note 68, at 864 (stating that employer submissions
to OSHA can be damaging to the employee because they "may contain
inaccuracies that will lead to a decision adverse to the employee").
129. See id. at 865 (asserting that the whistleblower proceedings before
OSHA are "forced waiting periods" the claimant must endure without a
guaranteed redress of injury).
130. See Ramirez, supra note 60, at 211 (arguing that OSHA does not have
the training and experience to effectively investigate complex SOX claims); see
also Earle & Madek, supra note 18, at 15 (observing that many claim
investigation of securities fraud is outside OSHA's competence and that its
investigators have yet to develop the knowledge necessary to understand
financial claims).
131. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, About the Division of
Enforcement, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm (last modified
Aug. 1, 2007) (outlining the goals and duties of the SEC's Division of
Enforcement).
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2. Substantive Reforms
a. Make Employers More Accountable for Their Actions
Congress should amend SOX to make the employers' burden
higher in attempting to rebut the retaliation claim by limiting the
scope of legitimate business reason, thereby making employers
account for their actions. 132 Instead of shifting the burden back to
the employee to prove retaliation if the employer furnishes clear
and convincing evidence that the employee would have fired for
independent reasons, the burden should belong to the employer to
also prove that the legitimate business reason for the adverse
decision was not a pretext. 133
Also, the SEC should enforce the criminal provision for
retaliation against the employers to deter them from retaliating in
the first place. Although SOX imposes criminal penalties against
anyone who retaliates against a whistleblower under Section
1107,134 it is only after the information is given to "a law
enforcement officer." Thus, unless an employee blows the whistle
specifically to a member of law enforcement, there can be no
criminal sanction imposed against the person who retaliateseven if an employee blows the whistle to a statutorily identified
person such as a supervisor or a member of Congress. 135 This
provision should be amended to include reporting to any of the
statutorily identified persons.
b. Enforce the Reinstatement Orders
The Second Circuit's decision that courts lack the jurisdiction
to enforce the preliminary orders of reinstatement was
tremendously detrimental to whistleblower protection.1 36 If a
court renders a decision finding that it lacks the power to enforce
132. See Watnick, supra note 68, at 867 (commenting that employers can
readily find some fault of an employee to use as a legitimate reason for the
termination and defeat most whistleblower claims).
133. See Christian, supra note 18, at 344 (stating that some administrative
decisions found that if the employer meets the burden, the employer only
rebuts the presumption of retaliation and still has to provide evidence that the
adverse employment action was not a pretext).
134. Codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2006), the statute reads as follows:
Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action
harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful
employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law
enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission
or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
135. See Dworkin, supra note 31, at 1764 (stating that the whistleblower
must give truthful information to a law enforcement officer, must show
employer's intent to retaliate, and such information must be correct before
penalties can be imposed).
136. Bechtel, 448 F.3d at 473.
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protection afforded in the Provision, it will discourage
whistleblowers from coming forward.137 Congress should amend
SOX to explicitly give courts the power to enforce the preliminary
reinstatement orders.
c. Give Financial Incentives to Blow the Whistle
To encourage more whistleblower to come forward, the
Provision needs to be amended to give financial incentives, much
like the False Claims Act. 138 Whistleblowing is an extremely
costly endeavor for an employee to undertake without a promising
consequence. 139 Because most employees are unsuccessful at
getting reinstated, giving a successful whistleblower a monetary
sum significant enough to compensate the risk they took will help
spur whistleblowers. The monetary reward could be funded by a
part of the fine levied against the employer or a portion of
recovered amount from the shareholder restitution.
d. Extend the Protection Extraterritorially
Employees of foreign subsidiaries, whether they are
foreigners or U.S. nationals, must also be protected. In the
current global market, it is difficult to envision a corporation that
does not have some international business presence. 140
Understandably, Congress did not want to enact a statute
explicitly granting extraterritorial application, where the provision
would affect labor relations of a foreign, sovereign country. 141 But
if the courts employ the conduct and effects tests,142 as the Second
137. See Watnick, supra note 68, at 856 (stating that the Second Circuit's
refusal to enforce the reinstatement order is "further discouraging would be
whistleblowers from reporting what they know").
138. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the False Claims
Act and the effects of giving financial incentives to whistleblowers).
139. See Earle & Madek, supra note -18, at 25 (arguing that it is hard for
employees to financially survive for years while their claims are being heard
and that most employees end up losing after years of battle).
140. See Ian Schaffer, Note, An InternationalTrain Wreck Caused in Part by
a Defective Whistle: When the ExtraterritorialApplication of SOX Conflicts
with Foreign Laws, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1829, 1835 (2006) (explaining that
international cooperation among regulators has increased to respond to the
global market, "where cross-border securities transactions have become
routine"); Nutt, supra note 99, at 218 (finding that in the new global economy,
many U.S. corporations have foreign subsidiaries outside the territory of
congressional reach).
141. See Small, 544 U.S. at 388-89 (finding that, generally, a statute enacted
by Congress is presumed to apply within the territory of the U.S. to prevent
unintentional discord between U.S. laws and those of foreign countries); see
also Schaffer, supra note 139, at 1843 (commenting that European countries
criticized the enactment of SOX because requiring its companies to implement
some of the provisions to comply with SOX to trade in the U.S. would violate
European privacy and labor laws).
142. The Effects and Conduct test were first used by Judge Hand in finding
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Circuit has aptly decided to consider, the Whistleblower Provision
can extend its protection to employees retained by foreign
subsidiaries. Although no court has yet to utilize the effects test in
the context of SOX, it would be appropriate to do so because the
effects test requires a court to consider whether conduct outside
the U.S. would have an adverse effect on the U.S. securities
market.143 This is consistent with the congressional intent of
enacting SOX to protect investors in the U.S. securities market by
spurring whistleblowers abroad to report fraudulent conduct that
can adversely affect U.S. market.144
V. CONCLUSION

So far, of the nearly 1,000 complaints filed under the
Whistleblower Provision, not a single employee has been
successful. 145
Without providing meaningful protection, the
Whistleblower Provision cannot achieve its main goal: protect
employees who report fraud from retaliation, thereby protecting
the shareholders.1 46 The proposals in this Comment are just a few
examples on what could be done. But Congress must ultimately
reconvene on this matter and procure a better solution to give
whistleblowers a clear legal protection. Congress must not act in
haste as it did in the wake of the corporate scandals of 2002.147
Back in Virginia, Welch is sitting in his chair mulling over the
question on whether he would blow the whistle again. After a
brief moment, he firmly states, "Yes, it is the right thing to do."l48
The David Welchs of this world need the protection they were
promised and deserve.

extraterritorial application of antitrust case in U.S. v. Aluminum Company of
America ("Alcoa'). Nutt, supra note 99, at 221-22.
143. Id. at 222. The two prongs of the effects test are: (1) whether the
fraudulent conduct was intended to affect U.S. market, and (2) whether the
fraudulent conduct in fact had an effect in the U.S. market. Id.
144. See id. at 217-18 (asserting that U.S. investors and securities market
cannot be protected without the extraterritorial application of the
Whistleblower Provision since fraud uncovered by foreign whistleblowers have
just as much adverse effect to U.S. securities market as does domestic fraud).
145. Stephen Taub & Tim Reason, Whistle-blowers Never Win, CFO, June 8,
2007, availableat http://www.cfo.comlarticle.cfm/9321686?f=search.
146. See Dworkin, supra note 31, at 1779 (explaining that Congress
recognized the importance of whistleblowers by encouraging whistleblowers
and making whistleblower protection a major part of SOX).
147. See Schaffer, supra note 140, at 1842 (stating that foreign
commentators disapproved of the enactment of SOX "as being hastily drafted
and as an attempt by Congress to achieve a quick-fix solution to corporate
governance problems in an election year).
148. Taub, supra note 2. In fact, in a study conducted, more than eighty
percent of whistleblowers reportedly would blow the whistle again if put in a
similar situation. Bucy, supra note 92, at 961.

